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C H I N A  A M O N G  THE NATIONS 
have already noted the entry of China into defined 
treaties of Nanking and Peking. T h e  conditions then en- 
forced as terms of peace, are, with slight modifications, the 
content of the so-called unequal treaties against which China 
is now in clamorous protest. There  was, however, little 
friction or sense of grievance until the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. T h a t  period represented the elevation 
of European aggression to  the level of conscious policy. I t  
flowed from the tireless effort of Russia to  open a pathway 
across the continent and to  give herself an impregnable 
terminus on the Pacific seaboard. T w o  results followed: 
one, the Russo-Japanese war which entailed temporary dis- 
aster for Russian ambitions; the other, the so-called battle 
of concessions. China came to  be regarded as a field of ex- 
pansion, and the nations were sufficiently in concert to  agree 
upon the lines of partition. This policy would have resulted 
in the division of China under the hegemony of the great 
powers, with exclusive control of resources and exploitation 
of trade. T h e  Japanese entered the program of continental 
aggression through their successful war, so only one great 
power, the United States, was l e f t  out of account. I t  tran- 
spired, however, very suddenly that we found ourselves a 
F a r  Eastern power through the unexpected acquisition of 
the Philippine Islands. Moreover, we were not unaffected 
by the general fever of imperialism, and we saw ourselves 
w relationships with Western nations through the 
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prospectively excluded from all opportunities that  China 
might present. 
I t  was under these circumstances that John H a y  gave 
utterance t o  the third cardinal principle of American POI- 
icy, that of the Open Door, coordinate with the principles 
of the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. While 
incidental to this discussion, it may be well t o  remind our- 
selves that foreign policy ceases to  be wish, and becomes 
intention, when it has a territorial basis. T h e  very term 
“open door” was first used in the instructions given the 
commissioners who went to  Paris t o  negotiate peace with 
Spain. I t  was presented as the cogent reason why we should 
acquire and hold the Philippines. This  should be remem- 
bered in the futile discussion that goes on endlessly regard- 
ing Philippine independence. W e  can no more withdraw 
from the Philippines than from the Panama Canal. 
T h e  Russo-Japanese war had given pause to  the policy 
of partition, but the open door declaration brought it to  
an end. H e r e  was a great power without foothold on the 
continent and refusing to recognize the exclusive privilege 
of any other nation in any of the preempted areas. I t  did 
not, however, loosen the European powers from the acquisi- 
tions they had already secured by forced lease. Thence- 
forth, competition for privilege turned into an effort t o  se- 
cure economic advantage through concessions from the 
Chinese government. 
China realized her helplessness, and her only mode of 
protection was to  play the powers against each other and 
thus keep alive their suspicions and jealousies. T h e  method 
of diplomacy in China has been to  maintain the concert 
when general pressure was needed, and then t o  revert im- 
mediately to  intrigue f o r  separate advantage. During the 
first decade of this century China was engaged in attempt- 
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ing to  learn how to  protect herself by adopting Western 
methods. T h e  major events f rom the fall of the manda- 
rinate to  the ascendancy of Yuan Shi Kai are particulars of 
this process of readjustment. Then  came the European 
war and the beginnings of the new story of China’s place 
among the nations. 
T h e  period from the opening of the war to  the Wash- 
ington Conference in 1922 may be described as that  of 
Japanese aggression. I t  will be remembered that  to  Japan 
fell the task of reducing and capturing the German holdings 
in Shantung. T h e  military operations were quickly success- 
ful, and Kiao Chau, with the city of Tsing-Tao, passed into 
Japanese possession; also the operation and policing of the 
Shantung railway. The  effect of these operations was sim- 
ply the replacement of German by Japanese control. 
In  the next year, 1915, conditions seemed propitious for  
Japan to  attain the ultimate object of her ambitions-that 
of the domination of Eastern Asia. European nations 
were fully occupied with their own struggle, and their very 
existence as Asiatic powers now depended upon the favor 
of Japan. America was already deeply involved in Euro- 
pean affairs with sympathies so oriented toward the success 
of the Allies, that it was certain she would do nothing to  
break their cohesion. I n  Japan, f rom the beginning of 
military participation, control of government and of policy 
passed to  the military party whose one outlook was con- 
tinental domination. These were the circumstances that 
led to  the presentation to  the government of China of the 
famous twenty-one demands. Every privilege that had been 
jealously sought by other powers was claimed; not only 
economic domination, but a degree of military occupation 
that could enforce conformity; and in addition the perma- 
nent Japanese possession of German holdings. T h e  effect 
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of these arrangements was to  reduce China to  a condition 
of vassalage. Here  was a sudden revelation of what Japan 
would do if opportunity presented-of stark, brutal ag- 
gressiveness-which it will require many years t o  obliterate. 
Yuan Shi Kai was at- 
tempting to  realize his imperial ambition. When it was 
evident that  America would not come to  the rescue, Yuan’s 
government, harassed by Japanese threats, accepted the 
bitter humiliation. Secret treaties were concluded with 
England, France and Russia, as a par t  of the hard bargain- 
ing of war, and the only country left  free t o  protest was 
the United States. 
When we entered the war in 19 17, we proceeded likewise 
t o  sell China as the price of Japanese support, or, what was 
in truth, neutrality. I t  would have been impossible to  tie 
this country into complete acceptance, such as  had been 
given by the Western Allies, but the LansingIshii agree- 
ment t o  recognize and respect the special interests of Japan 
on the continent, amounted to  a promise that  Japan should 
have a free hand. I t  is curious that  even war psychology 
could have carried us so fa r  toward repudiation of our 
traditional policy. 
T h e  next step seemed to  seal the fate of China, so f a r  
as protection from abroad was concerned. President Wil- 
son, brought face to  face with the secret treaties, and hard 
pressed by the whole course of the peace negotiations, gave 
acceptance to  the Japanese terms. 
T h e  strange thing is that  Japan should have convinced 
herself that  this patchwork of war bargaining could really 
secure her in the domination of Eastern Asia. T w o  new 
conditions arose. First, the United States, freehanded, un- 
injured by war, conscious of her power, began to  prepare 
to send Japanese imperialism af ter  that  of Germany. I t  
China was, as usual, helpless. 
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is hardly realized now how surely and completely an ava- 
lanche was forming and beginning to  move. T h e  difficulty 
was averted by the Washington Conference. 
Meanwhile, Japan was f a r  from having complete enjoy- 
ment of her new privileges. T h e  Siberian adventure had 
promised much and produced nothing. Military fever sub- 
sided quickly; moderate forces came into control; and 
Japan was not unaware of the menacing rumblings across 
the Pacific. But a still more important matter changed the 
course of her ambitions. China had but one effective wea- 
pon, the boycott. This was brought into action, when the 
results of the peace conference were known, with a univer- 
sality, a unanimity, and thoroughness which quickly showed 
the Japanese that military power and treaty agreements 
would never be effective in exploiting China. T rade  is 
more important than domination, and Japan can never be 
economically independent of China. T h e  boycott was not 
only a spantaneous reaction of the Chinese, but it repre- 
sented the first great concert of the people under the lead- 
ership of students of Western training. There  has been 
much confusion as to  the origin of the Chinese nationalist 
consciousness. I t  sprang into existence in 1919, when 
China, deserted by all the powers, faced with bare hands the 
unscrupulous and greedy designs of Japan. 
I t s  
ostensible purpose was to  arrive a t  an understanding as to  
limitation of armaments. I t s  real purpose was to  secure 
a redefinition of the whole F a r  Eastern situation. In par- 
ticular, it was the desire of the United States t o  bring to  
an end the Anglo-Japanese alliance which presented a seri- 
ous barrier t o  the purpose that was slowly forming to  
eliminate the menace of Japanese imperialism. 
Conviction had already been brought home to  the Japan- 
Then  came the Washington Conference of 1922. 
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ese that their continental policy had been mistaken. I t  was 
obvious that Britain, now closely associated with the United 
States in matters of general policy, and with her own vast 
interests menaced by the Japanese intervention, would not 
continue the r61e of ally. Nothing but loss and disappoint- 
ment had been entailed by the military policy. Japan was, 
therefore, already disposed to  a general recession from the 
demands of 1915, and to  a withdrawal from her holdings 
in Shantung. 
T h e  achievements of the Washington Conference in- 
cluded not only the termination of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, but also a realignment of the powers on the prin- 
ciple of the open door policy, which was a guarantee of the 
integrity of China. T h e  powers recognized the unfairness 
of the customs rates, and prepared the way for an increase. 
Nationalist consciousness in China was already clamoring 
for a cessation of extraterritoriality, and the powers agreed 
that this, too, should be given careful investigation and con- 
sideration. A double conference on tariff revision and extra- 
territoriality was to  be called to meet in Peking immediately 
after ratification of the treaties. Naturally, these delibera- 
tions could not be held free of the complications of Euro- 
pean politics, particularly those regarding arrangements 
for limitation of armaments. I n  order t o  delay ratifica- 
tion, France used the excuse of her claim that the Boxer 
indemnity should be paid in gold francs. Finally the treaties 
were passed, and a conference on the tariff and on extra- 
territoriality met late in 1925. They  amounted to  little 
more than a demonstration of the wish of Western powers 
to  make adjustments on matters that were regarded as of 
vital importance by the Chinese. A t  that time, and espe- 
cially in the beginning of 1926, China’s factionalism as- 
sumed a most confused aspect which made it impossible for 
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her to  speak in the conference with any accredited voice. 
As Japan regards an increase of customs duties as inimical 
to  her commercial interests, she spared no method or  sub- 
terfuge t o  defeat the program of tariff revision. As 
China could not possibly display a legal system calculated 
to  give protection to  foreigners, the result of investigation 
of extraterritoriality was a foregone conclusion. 
Meanwhile the F a r  Eastern situation had developed 
conditions favorable for the peculiar type of diplomacy in 
which the Soviet republic has become adept. In  the earlier 
stages before 1920, the Russian attitude toward China had 
been one of hostile aggression. When the tide turned 
against the White Russians with their backing from Japan 
and the allied Western powers, the Soviet drive included 
not only Eastern Siberia, but Manchuria and Mongolia. 
T h e  so-called Fa r  Eastern Republic sent emissaries t o  stir 
the Mongolian princes into revolt and endeavor to  tie them 
into a protectorate. But the Chinese managed t o  assert 
their supremacy, and Mongolia presented a typical oriental 
scene of contention, reprisal and massacre. 
In  1920, out of a clear sky came a complete change of 
Russian policy. An offer was made by Moscow to return 
the Russian concessions, to  renounce the privilege of extra- 
territoriality, and to  forego the benefits of the Boxer in- 
demnity. Soon an arrangement was made which brought 
an end to  the conflict over Mongolia, and provided a fairer 
basis for control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. When 
presently a Soviet diplomatic representative was sent to  
Peking, it was with the rank of ambassador which, ironi- 
cally, gave him precedence over the representatives of 
other powers. 
These steps were taken under circumstances that made 
China extremely susceptible to  a friendly approach. T h e  
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Western powers were deeply involved in their own troubles 
and had done nothing to  protect China from the maw of 
Japanese imperialism. T h e  ill-fated efforts t o  aid the 
White  Russians in their counter-revolution had left with 
the Soviets a bitter resentment that  would leave no method 
untried to  injure their enemies. China was dismembered 
among her war lords, who were ready to  avail themselves 
of any external aid to  advance their interests. Ultimately 
Russia needed a hold upon China in preparation for  the 
conflict which Japanese action was making inevitable. 
Russia had discovered through her own revolutionary 
experience that there was another method of inflicting in- 
jury than that  of firing projectiles from a distance; it was 
surreptitiously to  place and explode dynamite f rom within. 
T h e  new Russian diplomacy was that of systematically 
and persistently fomenting revolution by organizing and 
inciting the working classes. But propaganda needed fa- 
vorable conditions. Hence the extraordinary gesture of jus- 
tice and generosity in the retrocession of treaty privileges. 
Fo r  the first time in the whole course of Chinese foreign 
relations, something was given to  China and not demanded 
from her. Even so, it was a contest between the factions 
that provided Russia’s opportunity. T h e  Japanese had 
most assiduously cultivated a confusion that  would breed 
weakness. If there had been no civil war, one would prob- 
ably have been started by Japan. This  wish to  prevent 
unity had enabled Sun Yat  Sen to  secure Japanese support 
a t  the beginning of  the revolution. Later,  this support was 
transferred to  Chang Tso-lin who held three Manchurian 
provinces and who seemed a promising tool, not only for  
control of north China, but for  holding back Russian ag- 
gression. T h e  Soviet government therefore turned to  the 
South a t  a moment when help was sorely needed, and by 
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providing supplies, together with administrative and mili- 
tary commissions, started that association of Canton with 
communism which is now bearing its fruit. Meanwhile, 
Feng Yu Hsiang divided the two great Northern war lords, 
secured and held Peking for  two years, and gave Russia 
an opportunity to  work from the Northern capital. 
As the stock in trade of Russian propaganda is the incite- 
ment of workers against the bourgeoisie, and since China 
did not provide these classes, it served a double purpose 
for the Soviet government to  teach that all Chinese were 
oppressed workers and all Westerners were hated capital- 
ists. In  this way the normal antagonism of the Chinese to  
the Western powers was reenforced by an economic motive 
illustrated only by the few factories in the concessions. 
There  was thus initiated that period of foreign relations 
which may be described as one of anti-foreignism. 
This  new era has been characterized by a curious and al- 
most ironic change of attitude on the par t  of all the pow- 
ers. T h e  traditional method of treatment had involved a 
consistent display of firmness toward the Chinese. T h e  
powers might be rivals of each other, but the tacit agree- 
ment to  join forces in dealing with the Chinese government 
had remained the practically unbroken rule. When China 
attempted to  play for advantage through one of them, 
equivalent privileges were promptly claimed by the others. 
T h e  new attitude of Russia meant an attempt to  capture 
and capitalize Chinese good will. China, even in the chaos 
of civil war, found herself suddenly regarded as important 
enough to  be treated as an equal, and great concessions 
made to  secure her friendship. N o r  was Russia alone in 
adopting this attitude. Japan’s experience of the boycott 
had brought home the futility of attempting forceful domi- 
nation, so the policy of arrogant aggression was changed 
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t o  one of persuasion. I t  began to  seem to  the Chinese that 
a display of resentment could secure fa r  more favorable 
results than one of patient acceptance. 
T h e  Western powers, lamed and weary after five years 
of war, had little inclination to  undertake aggressive action, 
and little desire t o  add  to  their complications. Leadership 
in F a r  Eastern affairs had passed to  the United States, 
which necessarily made the non-aggressive open door prin- 
ciple the keynote of action. After the Washington Con- 
ference, the Western powers merely sat waiting for Chinese 
affairs t o  sort themselves. T h e  policy was to  maintain the 
status quo, which, however, no longer existed, and could not 
be recovered. They  pretended that there was a Chinese 
government with an accredited foreign office to  which their 
communications were regularly made. Th i s  play with a 
fiction merely meant five years of paralysis, while the fires 
of resentment flamed with increasing menace, skillfully fed 
by the Russian propagandists. The re  was a series of minor 
outrages which were duly protested to  a government whose 
authority barely reached the city walls. No attempt was 
made to  hold those with local authority accountable f o r  
what was done. T h e  Chinese believed, with good reason, 
that they could d o  much as they liked with no resultant 
damage to  themselves. T h e  feeling grew that the Western 
powers had  begun, not only to  respect, but to  fear China, 
and that this was a consequence of her own hostility, 
T h e  climax came in 1925 when mobs of demonstrators 
threatened destructive action in the concessions. T h e  for- 
eigners suddenly replied with force in Shanghai, Hankow, 
and Shameen. This added to  resentment a sense of out- 
rage, and China broke into a clamor so loud and bitter 
that the powers took every step to  placate and conciliate. 
But now anti-foreignism had changed from a feeling to  a 
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policy which required nothing less than the complete retire- 
ment of all foreigners from their treaty rights. This  has 
been the motive and the principle of cohesion in the Can- 
tonese or  so-called Nationalist Movement of the past two 
years, I t  is, however, one thing to  secure unity by an anti- 
foreign program, and quite another t o  put that  pro- 
gram into effect. There  was always danger that  teaching 
fo r  political results would be taken seriously by those 
reached through this method of incitement. The  real men- 
ace to  foreigners is that  of mob action out of the reach of 
control and accountability. Chinese armies have little dis- 
cipline, and the likelihood that troops may join the mobs 
o r  undertake mob action on their own account, is always 
present. T h e  feeling of foreigners has been that any form 
of retaliation might precipitate a greater trouble, and this 
reluctance has increased China’s belief in foreign timidity. 
It is probable that  i f  the Cantonese had learned to  respect 
foreign rights a t  the concession limits of Hankow, the 
outrages of Nanking would never have taken place. 
Le t  us now have a glimpse a t  the future and attempt to  
locate the problems involved in China’s relations to  other 
powers. These are of two kinds, those associated with the 
present situation, apd those connected with future develop- 
ments of policy. T h e  r6le of prophet is more than precari- 
ous in all that  concerns China. Confusion and complica- 
tion are there added t o  the uncertainty which shrouds the 
future in the West  as well as in the East.  T h e  best one can 
do is to  indicate what seem to be the chief factors and ten- 
dencies, and state what seems to  be their probable outcome. 
I t  may be said with reference to  the immediate situation 
that the powers are compelled to  face issues now which 
must of necessity be relegated t o  a later period. Present 
action is based upon what a Western government conceives 
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t o  be its primary duty, t o  give protection to  the lives and 
property of its nationalists. This  necessity may itself lead 
to  great difficulties. T h e  Chinese have forgotten that  West- 
ern powers have arms that are very long and very power- 
ful. They, themselves, understand little about diplomacy 
and much about direct action. With resentment erected 
into a policy, and mob violence the traditional mode of 
protest, there may easily be outrages which will compel the 
powers to  take forcible action. This  could conceivably, but 
improbably, lead t o  military intervention. 
T h e  great difficulty is that  China demands immediate re- 
vision of the treaties in a manner, and to  an extent, which 
would amount to  a complete retirement of foreigners from 
their present rights. I t  happens that these same treaty 
conditions constitute the foreigner’s guarantee of protection 
for  his life and property. T h e  surrender of the concessions 
would mean the loss of millions of invested capital. It may 
be taken as perfectly certain that the powers will withdraw 
from these concessions only when a stable Chinese govern- 
ment can make these investments as secure as they are  now. 
Otherwise, they will remain in foreign hands, and any at- 
tempt t o  take them will be met by force. T h e  same is true 
of extraterritoriality. T h e  governments of Great  Britain 
and the United States could not dream of leaving their 
citizens a t  the mercy of Chinese legal procedure a t  present, 
and probably for  some time to  come. I t  might be thought 
that  control of the Maritime Customs falls into a different 
category. As a matter of fact, this is the principal security 
for  the various loans that have been made to  China. These 
three factors in the treaties are  all, then, matters of pro- 
tection of life and property. They  can be altered only when 
a Chinese guarantee can, term for term, replace a foreign 
right. Our government spokesmen have repeatedly 
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indicated the readiness of this country to  alter the treaty 
conditions so soon as China can show ability to  give equiva- 
lent protection. 
This situation should be remembered by our people and 
should forestall the kind of clamor that has been made in 
recent months for our government to proceed a t  once with 
treaty revision without regard to  other powers. This  is, 
of course, a futile bid for  Chinese good will, which does 
not exist, and which would have no value i f  it could be called 
into being after our complete retirement from Chinese af- 
fairs. W e  took the leadership in F a r  Eastern arrangements 
a t  the Washington Conference; these arrangements depend 
upon full understanding and concerted action among the 
powers concerned. Britain has been made to bear the brunt 
of organized Chinese resentment for the past three years. 
T h e  British make no more claims to  protection of life and 
property than we ourselves. W h y  should we step aside and 
leave the whole difficulty for her to  handle? T h e  treaty 
rights we now possess were secured by stepping in after 
Britain had opened the way. T h e  President has recently 
stated that we are not deeply committed in China by reason 
of the fact that we hold no concessions. In  fact, we are 
equally responsible with Great Britain for the international 
settlement of Shanghai. Our citizens have invested im- 
mense sums in properties located in British concessions a t  
most of the treaty ports. W e  are perfectly certain that 
Britain is going to  protect her concessions and our invest- 
ments; it is not quite creditable to  pretend that we have 
no commitments. This  is of a piece with the self-righteous- 
ness with which we are giving currency to  the notion that 
Great Britain is in some way exploiting China, and that the 
nationalist movement represents an attempt to  free China 
from foreign tyranny. W h a t  the British are doing in China, 
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is precisely what we are doing-carrying on trade. There  
is no special privilege possessed by the British which we 
do not equally share; and there is no special privilege of 
any kind apart  from the protective arrangements already 
discussed. These will be relinquished when Chinese pro- 
tection is adequate. I t  is inconceivable that we can relin- 
quish them because a Chinese faction is raising a clamor and 
trying to  exert pressure. 
Turning now to  future problems, some of which may not 
be very remote, we may note the curious fact that China 
is attempting to  drive away the very powers that are con- 
cerned to  protect her integrity. T h e  Chinese who feel that 
they are sweeping to  a realization of their national destiny 
by cutting all connections with the West,  are acting as cats’ 
paws for the two powers whose ambitions menace the very 
existence of China as an independent nation. T h e  country is, 
in reality, a disguised battlefield where Russia and Japan are 
carrying on their struggle. T h e  Chinese believe they 
are fighting for the supremacy of one or another faction 
which they regard as a vehicle of the national hope. They  
are merely doing the fighting, such as it is, for these two 
powers. Sooner or later, the fight will come into the open. 
Each is willing to  see the West  eliminated, as then the re- 
ward of victory will be the control of China. 
There  is, however, no good reason to  assume that the 
Western powers will, o r  can be eliminated from F a r  Eastern 
affairs. Commitments are fa r  too extensive to  forego the 
benefits of trade, or to  permit China to  go as a prize of 
war under the domination of either Russia or Japan. We 
must, therefore, attempt to  estimate the possibilities which 
may be involved in future developments of Western policy. 
Let it be noted that there is nowhere within the present 
horizon any menace of territorial aggression by Europe or 
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America. Thei r  interests are recognized as lying entirely 
within the field of trade. 
The re  is, first, the possibility that the old rivalries may 
reappear, and with them a concert which might again at- 
tempt the delimitation of spheres of influence for exploita- 
tion. I f  the situation were as simple as a generation ago, 
this danger would be very great. W a r  has given European 
nations a tremendous increase of nationalist feeling. Policy 
is directed ultimately by what is conceived to  be necessary 
for  self-preservation. While the worst suffering may now 
be regarded as past, the needs of these nations are still so 
great that they may be driven to  seize every possible advan- 
tage. Thei r  military establishments are fully effective, and 
the occasion for  their use is not an impossible contingency. 
With the Russo-Japanese quarrel overt, it  may be difficult 
t o  avoid intervention with all its disastrous consequences. 
T h e  greatest barrier in the way of such a development of 
European ambitions is the position now occupied by the 
United States. T h e  open door policy is one of equal bene- 
fits of trade, and of unalterable opposition to  territorial 
aggrandizement, or the holding of special privilege by any- 
one. Any recession from this policy would be very slow and 
would have to  make its way through deep opposition by the 
American people. 
T h e  situation is, therefore, favorable to the other pos- 
sibility which, if accepted, may transform China from a 
field of contention to  one of international cooperation. 
And this in such measure as t o  aid largely in the kind of 
reconstruction which the world is now seeking to  effect. 
Our troubles have largely come from an unholy alliance 
of political with economic organization, which has domi- 
nated Western policy for the past three centuries. W h a t  
we assume to  be a perfectly natural relationship may be 
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seen in a few decades to  have been the one destructive 
factor in Western civilization. Of course, the thing has 
had a history. European nationalism had grown to  vigor- 
ous proportions before it seized upon trade as one of its 
instruments. T h e  Hanseatic League operated throughout 
Western Europe without political connection or military 
action. I t s  merchants were welcomed by all nations and 
the equal benefits of trade brought a degree of prosperity 
that none of them had previously experienced. 
Then  came the discovery of the New World,  adventurous 
conquest, settlement, and the search for new sources of 
wealth. Expansion quickly led to  national rivalries, and 
the contests of succeeding centuries were nearly always asso- 
ciated with the ambitions incident t o  the growth of empire. 
Colonial trade had to  be protected, and the economic bene- 
fits of colonial exploitation led to  the subordination of trade 
relationships to  political purposes. T h e  result has been 
the continuous seeking of special advantage a t  the cost of 
other parties to  trade relationships, and especially of the 
traders of rival nations. T h e  fallacious doctrine of this 
politico-economic association justifies the enhancement of 
national welfare no matter what the loss to  foreigners. 
Moreover, in modern times it is a universalization of the 
principles of warfare. Military action is only the breaking 
crest of a wave which is in motion a t  all times in the modern 
world. T h e  doctrine of economic independence is one of 
war, like that of seeking special and unfair advantage. A 
tariff wall has the same character as a military entrench- 
ment. I t  is absurd to  attack the problem of peace and war 
in its phase of blood-letting, while the actuality of warfare 
is going on all the time. 
T h e  mitigating forces are two in number. First, a slow 
comprehension that economic organization has no proper 
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connection with political purpose, and that trade which de- 
pends upon national backing for its life, may bring a few 
abnormal benefits as loot secured by force, but has no per- 
manent basis and can confer no lasting benefits. Economists 
are well aware that interference by government in trade to  
secure a special advantage, is fallacious in principle and 
ultimately self-defeating. Healthy trade has one simple 
principle-that of mutual benefit in the exchange of goods. 
This  point of view is obtaining an increased recognition 
because the world’s trade has attained such proportions 
and so great a degree of complexity, that all peoples are 
felt to  constitute a cooperative society. W h a t  has taken 
place in the domestic organization of each nation is extend- 
ing beyond national boundaries and thus slowly creating a 
condition of universal interdependence. 
I n  the second place, we are gradually emerging to  a 
clearer view of the true function of government in human 
society. I t  is the old and simple one of maintaining justice. 
Special classes have in the past used it for their own advan- 
tage, a procedure which led to their ultimate destruction. 
T h e  owners of wealth have sought t o  entrench themselves 
behind political authority. Now the workers strive to  cap- 
tare political power for the avowed purpose of taking for 
themselves the benefits of industry and commerce. Both 
attempts are, of course, doomed to  failure. W e  now un- 
derstand that it is the business of government to  regulate 
the whole system in such manner as to  insure fair treatment 
of all participants. This does not mean non-interference, 
f o r  Zaissez-faire means a reversion to  the law of the 
stronger. T h e  economic system is a vastly complicated, 
ever-changing conjunction of interests, any one of which can 
injure the healthy action of the whole, unless its action is 
controlled. T h e  competitive society is not as our fathers 
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thought, self-regulatory ; it requires the supervisory action 
of an independent authority acting solely in the interests of 
the general welfare. 
When this simple principle of government is expanded 
from the domestic to the universal economy, the possibility 
of permanent peace will come into view. There  is no such 
thing as the elimination of war by treaties or by leagues for 
the discussion of differences, so long as international trade 
is implicitly a battlefield. W a r  must be outgrown, not 
outlawed. Encouraging steps have already been taken in 
the effort t o  substitute adjudication for  immediate recourse 
to  violence. This, however, can have little effect until the 
principle is extended from public to  private international 
law. Causes of dispute in the modern world are almost 
wholly economic. Business of any kind is private in char- 
acter. When it is possible to  find an even-handed justice in 
the difficulties that  arise in international business, just as it 
is in one’s own county, a t  that point the world will find 
itself entering its new era of peace and prosperity. No 
supernational authority is needed if  each nation will give to  
adjudication based upon an accepted body of legal princi- 
ples, proper force and effect, and do  its part  toward enforce- 
ment. No nation as a whole can have a quarrel or cause of 
conflict, until it places its authority behind some group 
of its citizens. A secure justice which would grow in ac- 
ceptance would thus forestall national intervention in busi- 
ness affairs. 
In  spite of the fact that American policy is confused and 
often fallacious in its conception of national duty, and 
we are very likely to  see the interests of our people as the 
measure of the universally right, still there are several 
respects in which America is preparing the way for the 
new order. First, the United States is a highly organized 
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industrial society with specialization and consequent inter- 
dependence carried further than elsewhere. T h e  fruit of 
this is toleration. W e  are seldom tempted to  destroy those 
who are necessary for  our welfare. Again, while the 
country is surrounded by a tariff wall, the United States 
is within her boundaries the greatest example of a system of 
free trade. In the third place, political units have altered 
from almost national importance to a place of regulatory 
and administrative usefulness subordinate to the general 
welfare. 
In her external relations our country is capable of doing 
foolish and harsh things. Our  conceptions of international 
relationships are as unformed as the relationships them- 
selves are novel. W e  have merely kept away from com- 
plications, having a considerable continent of our own. 
Still this very fact has fixed our policy as defined in the 
Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door as one of non-aggres- 
sion. Any wide departure from this principle would pro- 
voke a deep reaction. 
T h e  foregoing has been said in order to  secure a point of 
view for our Fa r  Eastern policy, from which it can be seen 
for what it is-a thing upon which much of the future of 
the world is certain to depend. Our leadership in all ar- 
rangements is fortunate, because in the hands of a wise 
statesmanship it can secure the application of the principles 
of justice rather than those of national advantage. 
When China is seen in the tremendous r6le she is t o  play 
in the. future, our policy may be saved from the dangers of 
determination by adventitious and immediate circumstances. 
T h a t  r61e is a very special one in the family of nations. 
China provides no menace to  any other people. Military 
conceptions have no place in her culture, and military action, 
in spite of present appearances, no place in her national 
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organization. One cannot say that a few decades of pres- 
sure from outside might not produce a Chinese soldier, but 
this can only be done by changing everything in him that 
is Chinese. If anyone suffers from the bogy of the yellow 
peril, let him be reassured by the fact that population alone 
does not provide military effectiveness, that the Chinese 
people are poor beyond our comprehension, and that nat- 
ural resources which could be applied to  military equipment 
are so limited that they can meet simple industrial needs 
only by the most frugal use. Incidentally, the same may 
be said of Japan in spite of the belligerent gestures of the 
past generation. China is, then, necessarily pacific. All 
that any other nation can do  is to trade with her. Attempts 
a t  compulsion for special advantage will result in a situation 
like that of the present. There  is no one to  compel, and 
intimidation is soon lost in a mass of four hundred millions. 
I t  is to  be hoped that Chinese industry will develop to the 
point that will remove the greater temptations to  aggres- 
sion. In brief, the present situation, which to  the traditional 
outlook of the West is so confusing and paralyzing, gives 
an opportunity for a redefinition of policy and of methods 
of handling international relationships, which, if  accepted 
and fully utilized, may be the beginning of that new order 
about which we dream. 
JOHN WILLIS LAUGHTER. 



